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 Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly 
continuous with, the minds of other animals and simple agents. His treatments of 
mind, consciousness, free will and human agency all reflect this distinctive dual 
perspective. There is, on the one hand, the (in)famous Intentional Stance, relative to 
which humans, dogs, insects and even the lowly thermostat (e.g. Dennett (1998) 
p.327) are all pronounced capable of believing and desiring in essentially the same 
theoretical sense. And there is, on the other hand, a noteworthy (and increasing) 
insistence that human minds are special in that they exhibit a distinctive kind of 
“informational organization”: one that confers consciousness (Dennett (1998) p.347), 
and creates the space for agency, purpose, self-control (Dennett (1984) p.100), and 
“significant suffering” (Dennett (1998) p.351). 
 
What follows is a critical examination of this dual perspective, and of Dennett’s 
account of the key factor that makes us special - human language and our 
immersion in the sea of culture (Dennett (1998) p.146, (1996) p.130, (in press) p.7). 
In particular, I shall ask whether Dennett’s dual perspective masks a deeper tension 
in his accounts of consciousness and personhood, and whether the appeal to the 
transformative power of human language and culture can bear the heavy 
explanatory burden Dennett places upon it. These turn out to be significant 
challenges but ones which also help clarify the scope and power of this complex, 
multi-layered account.  
 
I end by commenting briefly on the wider significance of Dennett’s project as a major 
contribution to current debates concerning the continuity (or otherwise) of evolved 
cognitive strategies and the essentially hybrid (biological and non-biological) nature 
of human minds and persons. 
 
1. Thinking Up The Self 
 
 I begin by very briefly rehearsing the main elements of Dennett’s account of 
the emergence of our “kinds of minds”. The story moves through several distinct 
stages. Ground Zero, for Dennett, is the presence of what might be called “minimally 
rational response”. Many of the animals and artifacts, around us are in some broad 
sense “well- designed” and thus reward treatment as rational agents. Examples 
include the human, the racoon, and the thermostat. Such systems are   the proper 
objects of Dennett’s (in)famous “intentional stance” so well described in the 
Introduction to this volume. 
 Intentional systems, however, come in a variety of shapes and forms. In 
particular, Dennett likes to distinguish between what he nicely dubs “Darwinian”, 
“Skinnerian”, “Popperian” and “Gregorian” creatures. Darwinian creatures come in 
many forms. The most basic being the simple, hard-wired variety, whose 
ecologically adjustable, survival-enhancing responses are fixed by evolution. Next up 
is the Skinnerian variety, able to learn new strategies and responses by the 
reinforcement (via reward) of behaviour. Simple connectionist networks (artificial 
neutral networks whose processing profiles are tuned by training and reinforcement) 
fall, Dennett comments, into this category (see Dennett (1996) p.85), and exhibit a 
simple kind of learning which Dennett calls ABC learning (op cit, p.87). Popperian1 
creatures, however, are able to deploy an additional (and mighty handy) resource. 
Such creatures exploit a kind of inner model of their world, enabling them to try out 
moves in their imagination in advance of committing their physical bodies to the act. 
This strategy sounds fancy, but it is one deployed, Dennett suggests, by most 
animals whose sophistication exceeds that of the simple invertebrates (op cit, p.92). 
Minds like ours, Dennett finally suggests, use all the tricks just mentioned but add a 
                                                 
1 So-called because it was Karl Popper who memorably described certain cognitive 
designs as allowing “our hypotheses to die in our stead” (see Dennett (1996) p.88). 
final, language-and-culture based twist. For we are (in addition) Gregorian2 
creatures: creatures ‘whose inner environments are informed by the designed 
portions of the outer environment’ (op cit, p.99). The idea here is that ‘tool use is a 
two-way sign of intelligence: not only does it require intelligence to recognize and 
maintain a tool (let only fabricate one) but a tool confers intelligence on those lucky 
enough to be given one’ (op cit, p.99-100).  
 Given a tool (e.g. the nautical compass described in detail in Hutchins (1995)) 
the problem space confronting the biological brain (in respect of some real-world 
problem) is radically transformed and (often) simplified. In just this vein Richard 
Gregory (the psychologist from whom Gregorian creatures take their name - see 
note two) paid special attention to the use of words, conceived as themselves a 
special class of “mind tools”. Mind tools, in this sense, are any designed (or culturally 
inherited) constructs which help transform and simplify problem-solving in the inner 
(mental) environment. The resources of public language, as just mentioned, 
constitute the original and most singularly potent such mind tool. Brains equipped 
with such resources, and populated by a rich culturally accumulated stock of 
concepts and labels, become able (Dennett claims) to make a crucial cognitive leap. 
Where the Skinnerian creature is able to learn new behaviours, and the Popperian 
creature is able in addition to try out possible behaviours in mental simulation,  the 
Gregorian creature becomes able to actively think about it’s own thinking. By turning 
the communicative and cooperative resources of public exchange and discussion in 
upon themselves, such creatures are able to concern themselves with such 
questions as: "What is my reason for believing such and such?" "Is it a good 
reason?" "How sound is the evidence upon which I am about to act?" And so on. 
Such self-questioning (and the crucial attendant possibilities of improved “rational 
hygiene”) becomes an option, Dennett believes, only when the agent’s rationales 
can become objects for the agent: only when the agent has available ‘a 
representation of the reason [which may be] composed, designed, edited, revised, 
manipulated, endorsed’ (Dennett (1996) p.133). And the inherited mind tools of 
public linguistic expression, it is argued, provide natural support for such 
objectification. 
 Much more, to be sure, needs to be said about the precise way in which this 
magic is supposed to be worked. But it is the larger picture which I want first to bring 
into focus. And what matters here is just that the Gregorian creatures, courtesy of 
their special fluency with mind tools, are able to :   
Take a big step towards a human level of mental adroitness, benefiting 
from the experience of others by exploiting the wisdom embodied in 
the mind tools that these others have invented, improved and 
transmitted: thereby they learn how to think better about what they 
should think about next - and so forth, creating a tower of further 
internal reflections with no fixed or discernible limit. (Dennett (1996) 
p.101. My emphasis). 
In Dennett (1984), the same kind of story (of a cascade of cognitive 
                                                 
2 So-called after the psychologist, Richard Gregory, whose work stresses the role of 
designed artifacts in actively enhancing intelligence (see Gregory (1981) p.311ff, 
Dennett (1996) p. 99). 
innovations) is pursued, but with the special agenda of accounting for the gradual 
emergence of moral agency and self-hood. There, Dennett contrasts the Skinnerian 
and Popperian creatures (these labels, however, are drawn from the later works) 
with creatures exhibiting (in addition) ‘the open-ended capacity (requiring a language 
of self-description) for “radical self- evaluation”’ (Dennett (1984) p.100). Such self-
evaluation requires the explicit articulation of the values and ideals inherent in our 
actions and projects, and the development of deliberative skills that further enhance 
our capacity for controlled, value-reflecting action (op cit, chapter 4). Once again, it 
is the deployment of mind tools, especially those bequeathed by the capacity to 
make our reasons explicit using words that ushers human-like intelligence and 
agency into the natural order. The Gregorian creatures, and the Gregorian creatures 
alone, emerge as ‘loci of self-control, of talent, of decision-making. They have 
projects, interests and values they create in the course of their own self-evaluation 
and self-definition’ (op cit, p.100). 
 Finally, notice that the very same story is used (in Dennett (1991) (1996) and 
elsewhere) to account for the emergence of consciousness itself. Indeed, 
consciousness and personhood, for Dennett, seem to go pretty much hand in hand, 
courtesy of the crucial role played by certain mind tools in each case. Thus we read 
that: 
In order to be conscious - in order to be the sort of thing it is like 
something to be - it is necessary to have a certain sort of informational 
organization that endows that thing with a wide set of cognitive powers 
(such as the powers of reflection and re-representation).  
And this special kind of organization, Dennett clearly states is: 
Not part of our innate “hard-wiring” but in surprisingly large measure an 
artifact of our immersion in human culture. (Both quotes from Dennett 
(1998) p.346-7). 
 Consciousness, personhood, moral responsibility, free will, and even real 
thinking (see e.g. Dennett (1996) p.130, (in press) p.4) are thus all tied together, and 
ushered into the natural world by our peculier fluency with mind tools, especially 
those linguiform resources with which we are able to turn reasons into objects for 
reflection and refinement. The liberal embrace of the Intentional Stance 
notwithstanding, human thought is thus marked out as deeply different from the 
cognitive capacities of other animals. It is different courtesy largely of the culturally 
incubated mind-tools whose transformative powers open up the space within which 
we actively construct the experiencing and responsible self. Belief is cheap, but 












                                                 
3 See e.g. Dennett (1996) p.162 for a clear statement of the uniqueness claim, and 
of the idea that the Gregorian creatures have crossed a genuine threshold in 
cognitive space. 
2. How Might Mind Tools Do Their Work? 
 
 Let us call the matrix of special Gregorian features (consciousness, 
personhood, moral responsibility, free will, and “real thinking”) “mindfulness”. What 
makes mindfulness possible, on Dennett’s account, is, we saw, the operation of all 
those extra layers of mind tools we humans have added to our basic evolutionary 
heritage. Such a view is highly attractive, and it is certainly one that I myself endorse 
(see e.g. Clark (1997), Clark (in press) chapter 8). But it raises a number of deep 
and difficult questions which none of us (or so I believe) has yet fully addressed. The 
hardest such question is also the simplest: how, exactly, do the mind tools work their 
magic? 
 This is clearly the crucial question. But when it comes to the crunch, neither 
Dennett nor I have much to offer beyond some impressionistic speculation. Dennett 
stresses the role of culturally inherited mind-tools in labelling, organizing and 
controlling the inner environment of ideas and associations, and the importance of 
rendering explicit both knowledge and reasons for action4. And I have stressed the 
importance of harmonizing inner mental operations with external cognitive props and 
scaffolding, and the role of acquired linguistic labels in enhancing incremental 
learning5. At the heart of both these accounts lies a common factor: the idea of 
language (and public codes and foundations in general) as providing a new (and 
cheap!) realm of manipulable and re-recognizable objects upon which to turn more 
evolutionary basic capacities of recognition, imagination and learning. As Dennett 
nicely puts it: 
Once we have created labels and acquired the habit of attaching them 
to experienced circumstances, we have created a new class of objects 
that can themselves become the objects of all the pattern-recognition 
machinery, association-building machinery, and so forth. (Dennett 
(1996) p.150-151). 
 This process, Dennett claims, begins with our encounter with public language 
words, and our subsequent habits of inner rehearsal of “voiced concepts”, and ends 
with the effective installation of a whole inner economy of (if you like) idea-
processing technology: 
We build elaborate systems of mnemonic association - pointers, labels, 
chutes and ladders, hooks and chains...turning our brains into a huge 
structured network of competences. No evidence yet unearthed shows 
that any other animal does anything like that. (Dennett (1996) p.152). 
 That all sounds right. But once again, the question looms: just how, exactly, is 
all this supposed to work? For it is not (I claim) until we see (in much more detail) 
how it could all work that we can be in a position to judge just how much this kind of 
move can really buy us. Dennett plausibly suggests, for example, that it is only 
courtesy of our linguistic capacities that we can think certain thoughts. Examples 
include considering whether a certain visually-identical penny is in fact the very 
same penny that someone brought with them to New York many years ago (Dennett 
(1996) p.116) and the explicit representation of reasons (see section 1 above, 
Dennett (1996) p.131-133). More generally, Dennett endorses the view (Clark and 
Karmiloff-Smith (1993)) that there are large benefits to making explicit knowledge 
that is initially locked away in some special-purpose, context-dependent encoding, 
and he suggests that language is a crucial tool for such processes of explication 
(Dennett (1996) p.132). 
                                                 
4 See especially Dennett (1996) chapters 4-6. 
5 See especially Clark (1997) chapters 9 and 10, Clark (1998). 
 And once again, this all sounds promising. But the actual details remain 
uncomfortably vague. Why, for example, is the possession of linguistic mind-tools 
necessary for thinking the thought about the penny? Dennett seems to think this (‘It 
doesn’t take a rocket scientist to think such thoughts, but it does take a Gregorian 
creature who has language among its mind-tools’ (op cit, p.117)). But it is not at all 
obvious why this should be so. The question of necessity (or lack of it) is, I concede, 
probably not crucial. Perhaps public language is not strictly necessary for such 
thinking but is instead the (contingent) route by which it is achieved in humans (see 
Clark 1996b). What looks more important, however, is the slightly weaker claim that 
such thinking requires the use of al least some kind of mind-tool capable of 
objectifying concepts and relations. This I in fact believe, but still cannot prove to my 
own satisfaction.  One argument, roughly sketched, might be that certain kinds of 
abstract thought require the capacity to create and deploy what might be called 
'perceptually simple inner onbjects' as stand-ins for complex concepts, ideas and 
relations. I know of one rather compelling demonstration of this which I think is worth 
mentioning here, even though I have treated it at some length elsewhere (Clark 
1998). For it will help focus some further issues concerning the scope and power of 
Denentt’s overall vision.  
 The example (Thompson, Oden and Boyson (1999)) involves a study of 
problem solving in chimps (pan troglodytes). What Thompson et al show is that 
chimps trained to use an arbitrary plastic marker (a yellow triangle, say) to designate 
pairs of identical objects (such as two identical cups), and to use a different marker 
(a red circle, say) to designate pairs of different objects (such as a shoe and a cup), 
are then (and only then) able to learn to solve a specific new class of abstract 
problems. This is the class of problems - apparantly quite intractable to chimps not 
provided with the token-based training - involving recognition of higher-order 
relations of sameness and difference. Thus presented with two (different) pairs of 
identical items (two shoes and two cups, say) the higher-order task is to judge the 
two pairs as exhibiting the same  relation i.e. to judge that you have two instances of 
sameness. Some examples of such higher-order judgments (which even human 
subjects can find hard to master at first) are: 
 
  
 Cup/Cup  Shoe/Shoe 
  
 =  two instances of first-order sameness 
 
 = an instance of higher-order sameness 
 
 
 Cup/Shoe  Cup/Shoe 
 
 =  two instances of first-order difference 
 
 = an instance of higher-order sameness 
 
 
 Cup/Shoe  Cup/Cup 
 
 = one instance of first-order difference and one of first- order sameness 
  
 = an instance of higher-order difference 
 
 
The token-trained chimps’ success at this difficult task, it is conjectured, is explained 
by their prior experience with external tokens. For such experience may enable the 
chimp, on confronting e.g. the pair of identical cups, to retrieve a mental 
representation of the sameness token (as it happens, a yellow triangle). Exposure to 
the two identical shoes will likewise cause retrieval of ( a token of) that token. At that 
point, the complex higher-order task is effectively reduced to the simpler lower-order 
task of identifying (internal representations of) the two yellow plastic tokens as “the 
same”. 
 Experience with external tags and labels thus enables the brain itself, by 
representing those tags and labels, to solve problems whose level of complexity and 
abstraction would otherwise leave us baffled. Learning a set of tags and labels 
(which we all do when we learn a language) is thus rather closely akin to acquiring a 
new perceptual modality. For like a perceptual modality, it renders certain features of 
our world concrete and salient, and allows us to target our thoughts (and learning 
algorithms) on a new domain of basic objects. This new domain compresses what 
were previously complex and unruly sensory patterns into simple objects. These 
simple objects can then be attended to in ways that quickly reveal further (otherwise 
hidden) patterns, as in the case of relations-between-relations. And of course the 
whole process is deeply iterative - we coin new words and labels to concretize 
regularities that we could only originally conceptualize thanks to a backdrop of other 
words and labels. 
 This example, then, shows us several things. It demonstrates, in a quite 
striking way, how the provision of concrete labels can indeed “turbo-charge” 
biologically-basic modes of learning and comprehension. But it also suggests some 
of the apparent limitations of the larger story. For there is nothing about the 
“cognitive bonus” thus achieved that looks (superficially at least) to bear very deeply 
upon the development of self-hood, or of the capacity for consciousness and 
“significant suffering”. What we get is a useful account of how certain types of 
intelligence may bootstrap themselves to new levels if augmented with some 
additional resources. But can the appeal to mind-tools really illuminate the rest of the 
matrix of mindfulness: especially the key aspects of responsible agenthood and 
consciousness? And is there still some biological difference that enables us humans 
to repeatedly create and exploit so many mind-tools in the first place? Finally, if 
there is  such a difference, how can we be sure that is the use of the mind-tools, and 






3. Can Tools Make The Self? 
 
 A natural worry about the appeal to mind-tools in the constitution of the self 
arises from the surface grammar of tool talk. For tools, in normal parlance, need a 
user. Yet on Dennett’s account the nearest thing to a user we ever get is a kind of 
“user-illusion”, an illusion itself created by the operation of certain mind-tools 
(specifically, those of narrative). The idea (see Editor’s Introduction (this volume) 
and Dennett (1991)) is that our kind of conscious awareness depends rather directly 
on our culturally inculcated capacity to tell a story (to ourselves and others) 
concerning our own life, reasons and actions. It is the presence of this story that 
makes our pains and pleasures ours, our choices our own, and our experience the 
way it is. We are nothing more than a bag of user-less cognitive tools (some natural, 
some artifactual) held together by a kind of illusion-of-selfhood: an illusion rooted in 
the operation of the narrative-spinning capacity acquired courtesy of our facility and 
language. The story Dennett tells thus depicts our kind of consciousness as 
dependent upon a narrative-spinning capacity which literally creates the self (or is it 
just the illusion of a self?) to which experiences and actions are referred6. 
 Once again, the question to press is simply ‘how?’. How is it that the activity 
of spinning a narrative can bring into being a conscious self, a site of potentially 
“significant suffering”? It is tempting to think the proposal must be either false or 
circular. It would be circular if the narrative only counted when it was spun by a 
person: a pre-existing locus of awareness, understanding and experience. It would 
be false if it was imagined that the mere activity of (seeming to) tell a story about 
one’s life and one’s reasons for actions was somehow sufficient to construct “our 
kind of consciousness” from the void. 
 Or would it? I take it that, in some fairly dramatic sense, Dennett really is 
claiming something like the latter. He really is claiming that the constructing of a 
narrative distils consciousness and agency from the matrix of survival-enhancing 
innovations that constitute the biological organism. But the story hereabouts strikes 
me as less compelling than the previous story (the one concerning a specific 
“cognitive bonus” bestowed by the culturally-aided process of label production). 
 How might the spinning of a narrative (one that cannot be assumed to be 
already the narrative of a conscious agent) help bring minds like ours into being? 
Dennett offers a number of ideas none of which, I think, can quite carry the load. 
They include: 
•The idea that linguistic formulation yields a kind of shallow determinacy of 
content that simple belief-like states lack7. 
•The idea that linguistically rehearsed contents are especially well-positioned 
to win the struggle for control of action8. 
•The idea that any notion of a “point of view” depends on one story winning 
out over others, and that linguistic judgings are what allow such victories to 
occur9. 
•The idea that certain kinds of morally significant self-control require  the 
capacity to confront one’s own beliefs and reasons for action, and that the 
linguistically-supported objectification of our own mental states contributes 
deeply to this process10. 
  
 I suspect that the other contributors to this volume will have much to say 
about the first three of these ideas, so I shall restrict myself to one single comment. 
It is that even if all these points (the first three) are conceded, it remains unclear why 
conscious experience and “significant suffering” should depend on having these 
capacities in place. Certainly, neither determinacy of content nor linguistically-based 
capacities of wielding local control seem to have much to do with qualitative 
experience. And even the third idea, concerning the construction of a “point of view”, 
seems to be pointing to a feature of typical human consciousness that may well be 
unnecessary for pleasure, pain and suffering. 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Dennett (1998) p.351, and Dennett (1996) p.156-7. 
7 E.g. Dennett (1998) p.89-90. 
8 E.g. Dennett (1996) p.155. 
9 E.g. Dennett (1998) p.348. 
10 E.g. Dennett (1984) p.86, 90. 
 I propose to dwell, however, only upon the fourth suggestion: the idea that 
certain kinds of morally significant self-control depend crucially upon something like 
a capacity to treat one’s own thoughts, beliefs and reasons as objects. For it is here, 
I believe, that we come closest to seeing some kind of conceptually deep connection 
between the operation of certain mind-tools and the presence of fully-fledged human 
agency.  
 Dennett suggests that it is, in large part, our capacities of self-description that 
allow us to actively create ourselves as persons: ‘what you are is that agent whose 
life you can tell about’ (Dennett (1996) p.156). Such self-description is said to begin 
in early childhood, with fantasy self-descriptions such as ‘I am an ace fighter pilot’, 
and carry on throughout life (hopefully, though perhaps not actually, with a greater 
grip on the facts). But to get a full sense of the potential role of such self-description 
in constituting knowing moral agency, we need to go back to Dennett’s (1984) 
discussion of “self-made selves”. The key idea here, which we already touched on in 
section 1, is that the availability of a language of self-description opens up the 
morally crucial possibility of “radical self-evaluation”. Dennett is here deeply 
influenced by Charles Taylor (see e.g. Taylor (1976)) who depicts such self-
evaluation as involving first an attempt to formulate what was previously inchoate: a 
sense of what is important, and why it is important, that was previously merely 
implicit in the patterns of activity in which we engaged. And then a direct 
confrontation of that newly achieved articulation, during which we question, refine, 
affirm or reject certain elements. It is in this way that (as Dennett glosses Taylor) ‘we 
create our values while creating ourselves’ (Dennett (1984) p.90). 
 Such special deliberative skills, Dennett suggests, enhance our potential for 
self-control and for the improvement and stabilization of character. And a self, for 
Dennett, is ‘above all, a locus of self-control’ (op cit, p.81). We are thus presented 
with a cascade of types and levels of self control somewhat analogous to the 
cascade of adaptive strategies rehearsed earlier. At the bottom level is the simple 
capacity to control the motions of one’s own body. But the self emerges (if I read 
Dennett correctly) only when that control becomes in various ways self-conscious or 
transparent. Such a process reaches a kind of apex when the self-controlling agent 
can ask meta-level questions about their own general operating strategies, or styles, 
and assess how well these strategies and styles serve their desires and needs, and 
even (see Frankfurt (1971)) whether their desires and needs are the ones they really 
want. 
 Such dizzy heights of self-control become available, Dennett claims, only 
once organisms acquire a language of self-description. And this is because: 
The aspirant to a high order of self-control must have the capacity to 
represent his current beliefs, desires, intentions and policies in a 
detached way, as objects for evaluation. (Dennett (1984) p.86). 
  
The equations at the heart of Dennett’s account of the emergence of fully fledged 
human agency and self-hood thus look to be these: 
 
 Maximal Control = Maximal Self-Hood and Responsibility 
 
 Radical Re-Evaluation = The Route to Maximal Control 
 
If Radical Re-evaluation requires a language of self-description, then a link between 
fully-fledged agency and the presence of some language-like resource seems 
indicated. 
 Considered as an account of the pre-conditions of morally responsible 
agency, this argument (or equation) has much to recommend it. Moreover, it comes 
closest to displaying a truly critical role for the mind-tools bequeathed to us by public 
language. True, it might be possible in principle to acquire and exploit a “language of 
self-description” even in the absence of public language or practices of abstract 
symbolic communication. But for human agency, it surely is the practice of public, 
language-dependent, criticism and reflection that instills in us the kind of meta-
reflective skills that Dennett and Taylor highlight. The “cognitive bonus” that 
language confers thus seems central not just to the incremental learning of abstract 
concepts (see section 2) but also to the emergence of morally responsible agency 
(for further arguments to this effect, see Clark (1996-a), (in press-a)). 
 And this, I think is an intuitively appealing result. Non-linguistic creatures are 
not prominent candidates for thick moral agency. Given a morally-loaded concept of 
self-hood, they are likewise not likely to count as persons or selves (though weaker 
notions of personhood and self-hood may remain available). There is still nothing 
here, however, which speaks to the rather bulky remainder of our matrix of 
mindfulness: the presence of qualitative consciousness and the potential for 
significant suffering. To make the rest of the case requires one further move which I 
still find unwarranted, viz, to claim that experiences need a thick subject i.e. a 
subject whose capacities of self-knowledge and self-control lie at, or close to, the 
apex of deliberative reason described by Taylor. It is this last piece of the puzzle, the 
imagined link between qualitative consciousness, significant suffering, and the 
presence of a ‘complex subject to whom [things] matter’ (Dennett (1998) p.351, 
emphasis in original), that I still cannot seem to fit into place. As a result, the appeal 
to the transformative role of mind-tools (especially language) buys us a whole lot 
while (I suspect) not quite making the complete case that Dennett requires. The 
matrix of mindfulness has many parts, and the appeal to culturally incubated mind-





4. On Being Cyborgs 
 
 Shortfalls aside, the appeal to culturally incubated mind-tools must surely play 
a crucial role in any account of what’s special about human thought and reason. In 
this final section I shall examine some of the bigger issues, opportunities and 
problems that this looks likely to involve. 
 The most basic problem, of course, concerns the use and origin of the mind-
tools themselves. Take, for example, Dennett’s pre-eminent tool: the capacity to use 
words to label states of oneself and of the world. What does it take to acquire and 
exploit such a tool? The rats, hamsters and snakes of the world cannot seem to 
acquire this skill to any significant degree, no matter how hard we humans try to 
inculcate it. Chimps and dolphins, it seems, do significantly better. But no other 
animal looks capable of acquiring a linguistic framework comparable in depth, 
breadth, and expressiveness to our own. Doesn’t this suggest, rather strongly, that 
the crucial cognitive innovation (that special something) actually precedes, and in 
fact makes possible, the acquisition of human-style language and the subsequent 
cascade of designer mind-tools? 
                                                 
11 For my own recent, and quite Dennettian, attempt to complete the puzzle, see 
Clark (2000). 
 Well, yes and no. Consider a somewhat analogous (or so I claim) question. 
What is that special something that makes Granny’s fruitcake so good? Let’s rule out 
all the things that Granny’s fruitcake has in common with other, demonstrably 
fruitcake-y yet not-half-so-good, confections. What, we want to know, is Granny’s 
special trick? Here is an answer: Granny marinates her raisins in a special over-
proof Jamaican rum, yielding an exceedingly heady product. But wait. Not just any 
old raisins will do. In fact, many of the raisins used by inferior cooks would be unable 
to benefit from the proprietary over-proof immersion, being too small, spindly and 
burnt to absorb any significant amount of the Jamaican elixir.  
 So what is Granny’s secret? Is it the rum or the raisins? The question is kind 
of silly. The difference in taste is attributable, let’s suppose, to the rum. But the 
capacity to take that difference on board lies with the raisins. The case of language 
and mind-tools is, I suggest, perfectly parallel. The cognitive bonus that yields 
human levels of thought and reason may well be (as Dennett claims) largely due to 
what certain mind-tools do to, and with, the brain. But the capacity to acquire, 
develop and exploit such mind-tools may well itself depend on some prior (perhaps 
small) neural innovation. 
 It seems rather likely, in fact, that there is a double biological difference at 
work here. First, there is the neural innovation that lets a recursive, recombinable 
public language get a grip. But second, there is an additional biological difference 
involving unusually extensive neural plasticity (centered on the cortex)12 coupled 
with an extended period of sheltered learning and development (the extended 
human childhood). Thus consider the evolutionary story sketched by Griffiths and 
Stotz (in press). These authors (who cite Furth (1987)) suggest that ‘human 
evolution has given rise to a new stage of development: childhood’. And childhood, 
they suggest, provides a window of learning in which ‘cultural scaffolding [can] 
change the dynamics of the cognitive system in a way that opens up new cognitive 
possibilities’ (both quotes from Griffiths and Stotz (in press) p.11). This whole 
account resonates deeply with the Dennettian ideas explained earlier. Thus the 
authors convincingly argue against what they term a “dualistic account of human 
biology and human culture” in which a process of biological evolution first produced 
the “anatomically modern human” and was then followed by the (ongoing) process of 
cultural evolution. Such a picture invites us, they note, to conceive of a kind of true 
biological human nature underlying the culturally-clothed product. But the project of 
investigating this naked biological nature, they argue, is ‘as misguided as seeking to 
investigate the true nature of an ant by removing the distorting influence of the nest!’ 
(op cit, p.10). By contrast, Griffiths and Stotz depict human nature as the complex 
product of a “developmental matrix” in which the influences of biology, artifact and 
society are pretty well inextricably intertwined. They conclude, nicely in line with 
recent work on situated and embodied cognition (see Clark (1997)) that: 
The individual representational system is part of a larger 
representational environment which extends far beyond the skin. 
Cognitive processes actually involve as components what are more 
traditionally conceived as the expressions of thought and the objects of 
thought. Situated cognition takes place within complex social structures 
which ‘scaffold’ the individual by means of artifactual, linguistic and 
institutional devices...culture makes humans as much as the reverse. 
(Griffiths and Stotz (2000) p.?). 
                                                 
12 See recent work on “neutral constructivism”, e.g. Quartz and Sejnowski (1997 ), 
Quartz (1999 ). 
 Notice, then, an intuitive but fallacious idea that we need to firmly reject. It is 
the idea that mind-tools cannot make us fundamentally more intelligent since we had 
to be exactly that intelligent to create them in the first place. Such an argument is 
multiply flawed. It is flawed because not all artifactual innovation is the result of 
deliberate design. It is flawed because multiple individual intelligences, spanning 
multiple generations, are involved in the production of the culturally-inherited set of 
mind-tools. And it is flawed because even a tool that I myself design and use can do 
more than merely enhance my practical problem-solving ability. Experience in using 
such a tool can, over time (and especially during the sensitive periods of early 
development), alter the way my brain actually works, so as to yield a better brain-tool 
union. (This latter process, in which human brains alter to fit the tools created by 
(previous) human brains, I call “cognitive dove-tailing” - see Clark (1998)). 
 All of which serves to reinforce the conclusions reached by Griffiths and Stotz. 
It is a mistake to posit a biologically fixed “human nature” with a simple “wrap-
around” of tools and culture. For the tools and culture are as much determiners of 
our nature as products of it. Ours are especially plastic brains (see note 12) whose 
biologically proper functioning has always involved the recruitment and exploitation 
of non-biological props and scaffolds. More so than any other creature on the planet, 
we humans are natural-born cyborgs, tweaked and primed so as to participate in 
cognitive and computational architectures whose bounds far exceed those of skin 
and skull. 
 In his own pursuit of such themes, Dennett has tended to stress the 
transformative effects of the cultural, linguistic and artifactual surround upon the 
brain (the creation of the “user-illusion”, for instance, is the creation of an internal 
kind of “informational unification” - see Dennett (1998) p.346-7). I have tended, by 
contrast, to stress the new dove-tailed wholes comprising brains, bodies and 
complexes of external props and scaffolding (see e.g. Clark (1997) chapter 9).  
These two (entirely compatible) perspectives converge, of course, in the 
developmental matrix highlighted by Griffiths and Stotz. I think it remains an open 
question, however, just how extensive and important a role is played by the 
“internalization” of mind-tools, as against a process (falling somewhat short of full 
internalization) in which the brain adapts so as to better use and exploit tools that 
remain firmly located in the external environment (see e.g. Hutchins (1995) for a 
wonderful exploration of this scenario). 
 Let me end, however, by flagging just one more issue - one that suggests a 
possible tension within Dennett’s overall picture. The issue concerns the cognitive 
continuity between human minds and the minds of other (non-Gregorian) animals. 
Just how special are human minds in the earthbound natural order? At times, and 
increasingly so in recent years, Dennett seems to think our minds are very special 
indeed. He writes, for example, that: 
[Chimpanzees] may well be incapable of thinking about thinking. They 
may, indeed, not really be capable of thinking at all (in some florid but 
important sense of thinking) (Dennett (in press) p.4). 
Or again, consider the claim about consciousness: 
My claim is not that other species lack our kind of self-
consciousness...I am claiming that what must be added to mere 
responsivity, mere discrimination, to count as consciousness at all is 
an organization that is not ubiquitous among sentient organisms. 
(Dennett (1998) p.347). 
And again: 
‘It may not be able to talk, but surely it thinks!’ - one of the main aims of 
this book has been to shake your confidence in this familiar reaction. 
(Dennett (1996) p.159). 
 In all these quotes (and there are many more) Dennett seems to be linking 
real thinking to the presence of the kind of description language necessary for the 
project of radical self-evaluation and meta-level reasoning. Yet elsewhere 
(sometimes on the very same page) we encounter what appears to be a much more 
liberal story: 
What structural and processing differences make different animals 
capable of having more sophisticated beliefs?...there are many, many 
differences, almost all of them theoretically interesting, but none of 
them, in my opinion, marking a well motivated chasm between the 
mere mindless behavers and the genuine rational agents. (Dennett 
(1998) p.331). 
Or on the matter of consciusness: 
The very idea of there being a dividing line between those creature “it 
is like something to be” and mere “automata” begins to look like an 
artifact of our traditional presumptions. (Dennett (1998) p.349). 
 Granted, there are many careful phrasings in Dennett’s corpus which allow 
these two perspectives (roughly, one of cognitive continuity and one of cognitive 
discontinuity) to exist side by side. For example, there is said to be a continuity of 
belief-states and a discontinuity at the level of linguistically -infected “opinions” (see 
Dennett (1998) chapter 4). But there seems (to me at least) to be a deeper tension 
here which cannot really be massaged away by the careful use of words. 
Sometimes, Dennett tries to reject the very issue that I am here (with some 
trepidation) raising, as when he writes: 
At what point in evolutionary history did real reason-appreciators, real 
selves, make their appearance? Don’t ask...it is a fool’s errand to try to 
identify a first or most simple instance of the “real” thing. (Dennett 
(1998) p.362). 
 But while I agree that firm dividing lines and clear first instances are often 
(indeed typically) not to be found, it does not follow that there are no profound 
organizational differences which demarcate (even with vague mid-points) the true 
selves and reason-appreciators from the rest. Indeed (and this is why the tension 
still strikes me as potentially important ) Dennett himself, as we just saw, often 
seems to assert as much - and recall also his (1984) discussion of the construction 
of the morally responsible self via the linguistically mediated installation of habits of 
self-criticism and self-evaluation (as discussed in section one above). Yet in this 
latter case, at least, Dennett is never tempted to speak elusively of “our kind of 
morality”, or to deny the existence of a firm (even if fuzzy-at-the-edges) distinction 
between the radical self-evaluators and the rest. In short, I suspect that Dennett 
really needs to make a hard call in the case of thinking itself, and to decide whether 
the presence of various linguistically mediated transformations and enhancements 
does or does not mark a truly deep discontinuity in the space of mind-designs. 
 The question may perhaps be put like this: just how important are opinions? 
How important, cognitively-speaking, are the special linguistic mind-tool generated 
states underlying our capacities of self-evaluation and meta-deliberation? My own 
hunch is that these capacities are crucial neither for the genesis of 'real' thought, nor 
consciousness. But that once present, they make a large difference to the space of 
learnable concepts and hence to the space of possible mental contents. In 
sometimes speaking of ‘our kind of thinking’ (Dennett (1996) p.130) or ‘our kind of 
consciousness’ (Dennett (1998) p. 346), Dennett elides the difference between the 
types of contents of thoughts and experiences, and the very presence of thinkings 
and experiencings. This helps mask the tension. But it will not, I suspect, make it go 
away. 
 It is, of course, part of Dennett’s even larger project to re-cast many major 
issues as (precisely) turning on the contents of representational states rather than 
the presence or absence of the ‘mythic light bulb of consciousness’ (Dennett (1998) 
p.349). So one way to interpret my portrayal of an apparent tension would be to try 
to cast it as a simple failure to appreciate this major element of the story. But that, I 
suspect, is a little too fast. For even if it is (if you like) content all the way down, it 
remains possible that the appreciation of reasons requires the capacity to entertain 
and manipulate specific kinds of content that are (absolutely) beyond the reach of 
other animals, while the contentful states necessary for the presence of qualitative 
consciousness and simple thoughtfulness do not.  
 As I finish writing these words, I find myself unsure whether the tension I 
seem to detect is real, or if real, important. For without a doubt any decent scientific 
image of mind must be an image of multiple, criss-crossing continuities and 
discontinuities. What matters most, and where Dennett truly excels, is in the careful 
elaboration of the warp and weave of multiple design elements, both inner and outer, 
and of their roles in generating the patterns of whole-agent behaviour that inform our 
intuitive understandings of minds and selves. By this unusual (philosophically 
speaking) means, Dennett hopes to show us who and what we are. He hopes to 
show us what makes us special, while reminding us that we are neither miraculous, 
nor fundamentally disjoint from the rest of nature's adaptive engines. We too are 
bags of user-less survival tools. But in our case, there is the additional shimmer of 
the user-illusion and the potent capacity - in cultural, linguistic and artifactual context 
- to engage in biologically novel acts of self-evaluation and self-definition. We are 
about as natural as a Palm Pilot on a sunny day, and as special, and mundane, as 
any new technology built on a platform of old parts. In pursuing such a delicate 
balance between pride and humility, and in displaying the essentially hybrid 
(biological/non-biological) nature of human minds and persons, Dennett sets a rich 
and complex agenda: one whose full cultural, scientific and philosophical 
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